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Abstract
This paper develops the link between poverty and inequality by focussing
on a class of poverty indices (some of them well-known) which aggregate
normative concerns for absolute and relative deprivation. The indices are
distinguished by a parameter that captures the ethical sensitivity of poverty
measurement to “exclusion” or “relative-deprivation” aversion. We also
show how the indices can be readily used to predict the impact of growth on
poverty. An illustration using LIS data ﬁnds that the United States show
more relative deprivation than Denmark and Belgium whatever the per-
centiles considered, but that overall deprivation comparisons of the four
countriesconsidered willgenerallynecessarilydependontheintensityofthe
ethical concern for relative deprivation. The impact of growth on poverty is
also seen to depend on the presence of and on the attention granted to con-
cerns over relative deprivation.
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May, 19991 Introduction
Since the work of Sen (1976), taking into account inequality among the
poor, and not solely the incidence or average intensity of poverty, has be-
come common scientiﬁc practice and has generated a considerable literature
1. Alongside this has grown a belief among several researchers and policy
analysts that concerns of relativity were also important in assessing poverty
lines. In the words of Townsend (1979), a well-known proponent of that
relativist view:
“Individuals, families and groups in the population can be said to be in
poverty when they lack the resources to obtain the type of diet, participate in
the activities andhave the living conditionsand amenitieswhichare custom-
ary, or are at least widely encouraged or approved, in the societies to which
they belong. Theirresourcesaresoseriouslybelow thosecommandedbythe
average individual or family that they are, in effect, excluded from ordinary
living patterns, customs and activities.” (p.31)
The link between poverty and relative exclusion from society also tran-
spiresfromthe ofﬁcialuse ofthe conceptofsocialexclusionintheEuropean
Commission, where it is deﬁned “in relation to the social rights of citizens
(...) to participation in the major social and occupational opportunities of
the society.” (Room (1992), p.14) On his part, Sen believes that comparing
poverty across distributions may involve “different standards of minimum
necessities” (1981, p.21) and “that absolute deprivation in terms of a per-
son’s capabilities relates to relative deprivation in terms of commodities,
incomes and resources” (1984, p.326). This view is somewhat supported
by the large number of cross-country comparisons using proportions of me-
dian or mean incomes as poverty lines. Another link between poverty and
relativity is the frequent normalisation of poverty indices by possibly dif-
ferent poverty lines (see, for instance, Foster et al. (1984)), which typically
leads to “relative poverty indices” as deﬁned in Blackorby and Donaldson
(1980). Foster and Shorrocks (1988), Foster and Sen (1997) and Davidson
and Duclos (1998) show how such normalisation links relative poverty and
relative inequalitycomparisons. Finally, having identiﬁed the poor andmea-
sured the respective intensity of their poverty, individual poverty is usually
aggregated into global poverty indices, and “in the ’aggregation’ exercise
the magnitudes of absolute deprivation may have to be supplemented by
1See e.g., Takayama (1979), Kakwani (1980), Clark et al. (1981), Atkinson (1987) and Foster
et al. (1984) for such work, and Foster (1984), Chakravarty (1990), Foster and Sen (1997) and
Zheng (1997), among others, for a review of different aspects of the social welfare, poverty, and
inequality literatures.
1considerations of relative deprivation” (Sen (1981),p.32).
Among all these links between poverty, inequality and exclusion, it is on
the one between poverty and relative deprivation in the latter “aggregation
exercise”that we wish to focus particularlyin this paper2. We willdo this by
developing a class of poverty indices which combine concerns of absolute
deprivation and of relative deprivation. Absolute deprivation is undoubtedly
“an irreducible core (...) in our idea of poverty, which translates reports of
starvation, malnutrition and visible hardship onto a diagnosis of poverty”
(Sen (1981), p.17). Although sometimes neglected by economists, relative
deprivation has been linked to “deﬁnable and measurable social and psycho-
logicalreactions,suchasdifferenttypesofalienation”(DurantandChristian
(1990), p.210) by social psychologistsand to social protests, discrimination,
feelings of injustice and subjective ill-being (Olson (1986)). It has also been
used to interpret measures of inequality and income redistribution (see for
instance Yitzhaki (1979) and Duclos (1999)).
The class of poverty indices we consider in this paper is a generalisa-
tion of the Sen(1976)-Thon(1979)- Chakravarty(1983)-Shorrocks(1995) in-
dices of poverty. The indices depend upon an ethical parameter
￿ which
captures the sensitivity of poverty measurement to “exclusion” or “relative-
deprivation” aversion. The greater the value of
￿ , the greater the weight
assigned to relative deprivation as against absolute deprivation in measuring
and comparing poverty.
The next section sets up the basic deﬁnitionsand shows the link between
generalised Gini indices and relative deprivation, upon which our subse-
quent work draws. Section 3 then shows how our class of poverty indices
can be understood as a weighted sum of absolute and relative deprivation.
It also points to the indices’ useful and simple graphical interpretation as
weighted areas underneath cumulative poverty gap (CPG) curves, and indi-
cates how they can be used to assess the impact of growth on poverty and
for decomposition analyses. Section 4 illustrates some of the results using
Luxembourg Income Study data drawn from 4 countries. For a reasonable
common poverty line, we ﬁnd that, whatever the percentiles considered, the
United States have more relative deprivation than Denmark and Belgium,
but that the relative deprivation curve for Italy crosses that of the three other
countries. Moreover, for all but one of the six possible country comparisons,
2Forthisaggregativeexercise,anabsoluteora relativepovertylinecanbeequallywellbeused.
For what follows, however, we assume this line to be the same for the measurement of absolute
and relative deprivation. The aggregation exercise and the results of the paper could, however, be
extended to the use of different poverty lines for the measurement and the aggregation of absolute
and relative deprivation.
2it is not possible to make unambiguous robust poverty orderings based on
CPG curves. Since absolute deprivation and mean poverty are very similar
in the four countries, we thus ﬁnd that unambiguous poverty comparisons
would inevitably depend on the importance granted to concerns over rela-
tive deprivation. The impact of growth on poverty is also seen to depend on
the presence of and on concerns for relative deprivation: in pairwise com-
parisons, poverty is least responsive to growth in the USA and in Denmark,
which is also where relative deprivation is the greatest. The last section
concludes our paper.
2 Inequality and relative deprivation





in the nonnegative real line. Let a poverty line be denoted by
￿ , and deﬁne





































































+ . Finally, let the
poverty gap of an individual at percentile (or rank)
￿

























































Hence, if perfecttargetting of the poor were possible,
￿
?
6 would give the per
capitaexpenditureswhichthe state wouldneed tospendin order to eradicate




give any ethical or normative weight to inequality in the distribution of the
poverty gaps.





















3For expositional simplicity, we assume a continuous distribution of incomes, although all
of the analytical results of this paper can also be shown in the context of discrete distributions.
For expositional simplicity, we also do not normalise poverty gaps by the poverty line; besides,
although this normalisation is often found in the literature, it is not clear that it would be an
appropriate procedure if we were to compare poverty across distributions whose poverty lines
differed in real terms (see, e.g., Atkinson (1991) and Davidson and Duclos (1998)).
4See also Jenkins and Lambert (1997) who call this curve a ”TIP” curve and Shorrocks (1998)
who labels it a ”Poverty Proﬁle” curve.






































































% poorest members of the population. As we shall see, the curvature
of the CPG curve also shows the extent of inequality in the distribution of
the poverty gaps. 5
The CPG curve is continuous, non-decreasing and concave in
￿
, as we














￿ have been drawn
for two hypothetical distributions,
Q and
R . As can be seen on the Figure,
Q has everywhere a greater average poverty gap whatever the percentage
of the poorest part of the population considered.
Q has also more inequal-
ity among its poor than
R (for which all poor have the same incomes, as
can be seen from the initial straight line segment).
Q has nevertheless a
lower headcount than
R . In determining which of
Q or
R has more poverty,
there may therefore exist a trade-off between the number of the poor (the
“incidence” of poverty














￿ on which we will focus in this paper will all
indicate that poverty is greater in
Q than in
R (although the headcount in-













￿ . This orderingof poverty in terms of CPG curves is in fact valid for a




￿ , as shown in Jenkinsand Lambert
(1997) and in Shorrocks (1998). Let
T be the class of poverty indices
U that

















































A useful tool for capturing the inequality in the distribution of poverty























b is the mean of the distribution of censored
incomes. This allows us to decompose the CPG curve into components due


































































































% poorest if aggregate poverty HI were equally
distributed across the population
R









% poorest due to the inequality in the
distribution of aggregate poverty.





￿ can be split in two parts, mean deprivation
(A) and “excess” deprivation due to inequality of poverty (B), as shown in
Figure2. As Figure2 alsosuggests, we willsee later thatthisdecomposition
gives rise respectively to absolute and relative deprivation.
To capture inequality of poverty in an aggregate index, ﬁrst recall that
























The Gini index is thus the average distance between population shares and
income shares of various possible proportions (between 0 and 1) of the
poorer in a population. A well-known single-parametergeneralisationof the








































￿ between the line of










































































p , the weight is






















lation share and income share decreases with
￿
, and more and more rapidly
so as











) ) can be interpreted as
the probability that an individual with rank
￿





) individuals randomly selected from the population






































6See Kakwani (1980), Donaldson and Weymark (1980, 1983) and Yitzhaki (1983).


































It is well-known that the standard Gini coefﬁcient can be understood as
an index of relative deprivation (Sen (1973), Yitzhaki (1979) and Hey and
Lambert (1980)). Duclos (1999) also shows a similar result for the s-Gini.
To see this, assume that an individual
￿ with an income
￿
￿














































This formulation has often been justiﬁed by reference to the classical deﬁni-
tionofrelative deprivation foundinRunciman(1966, p.10): “Themagnitude
of a relative deprivation is the extent of the difference between the desired
situation [e.g., the income of the richer] and that of the person desiring it”.
The expected relative deprivation of individual
￿ with respect to the whole
population of



















































































We now wish to aggregate each individual’s relative deprivation into an











































7For ease of reference, note that in a discrete setting with a ﬁnite population of
￿ individuals,
the weight on the income of an individual with rank
￿ (when individuals are sorted in increasing















































6The standard Gini coefﬁcient is thus obtained as a mean-normalised ex-

































￿ is the expected relative





) individuals randomly drawn from a population. Thus, the
greater the value of
￿ , the more weight is given to the relative deprivation of
the poorer (see Duclos (1999) for more on this).
3 A Class of Poverty Indices
3.1 Poverty and Deprivation













































￿ can also be expressed as a






































































































￿ has therefore a nice graphical interpretation in Figure 2 as the
sum of the weighted area of absolute deprivation and of the weighted area












￿ , we also obtain











p.81). For other references to that class of poverty indices, see Hagenaars (1987) and Shorrocks
(1998).













































































n average absolute deprivation (average shortfall from the poverty line)
R










￿ indices are thus an ethically weighted sum of absolute and rela-
tive deprivation. Absolute deprivation is the average shortfall (HI) from the
poverty line. Relative deprivation is the ethically weighted average short-
fall from the incomes of others9. As noted above, this concept is linked to
the current widespread concern for social exclusion, which, as Silver (1994,
p.557) remarks, entails “the drawing of inappropriate group distinctions be-
tween free and equal individuals which deny access to or participation in
exchange or interaction”, including participation in the socially perceived




) , no account is taken of rela-
tive deprivation in the computation of the poverty index. The higher the
value of
￿ , the more important is relative deprivation in assessing poverty,
and the more important is the relative deprivation of the most excluded in
assessing overall relative deprivation.











normalised per capita normative cost of inequality (see Atkinson (1970) and
Sen (1973)).
3.2 Poverty and growth
Poverty assessments and poverty proﬁles are often made to guide public





9Note that these comparison incomes are censored at the poverty line. This censoring of ref-
erence incomes at the poverty line can nevertheless be justiﬁed by the view of Runciman (1966,
p.29) that “people often choose reference groups closer to their actual circumstances than those
which might be forced on them if their opportunities were better than they are”. With that view,
we may think of the poor as referring to the rich as not being in poverty, and thus to their incomes
as not being below the poverty line.
8of poverty would fall if all incomes rose by one dollar (following, say, a
uniform fall in a poll tax or an increase in a lump-sum transfer), or if all
incomes increased by the same proportion (following, say, a surge in some
inequality-neutral economic growth). These changes in poverty can in par-
ticular guide the design of subsidies or transfer targetting, in the manner of










￿ index when all of the poor in a distribution are assumed to have























+ . For a
uniform per capita marginal income change,
=
￿








































￿ is straightforward to compute since it only requires the head-
count, the poverty line and the ethical parameter
￿ . The greater the focus on
the poorest (when
￿ is large), the greater the change in deprivation since the
increase in
￿ is then deemed to be more effective. The increase in income
for those above the poverty linehas indeed no effect on deprivation, absolute
or relative, and this is seen as wasted when relative deprivation and ethical
focus on the poorest are given little weight in assessing poverty.
For a proportional marginal change
=
(


























whose computation again only requires knowledge of
￿ , the headcount and
thepre-changepoverty index. Hence,a1% inequality-preserving increasein










￿ . This corresponds to a situation where the poor are many
but absolutely and relatively little deprived, namely, to a situation where







￿ indices have a nice graphical interpretation and have
been shown to be a sum of absolute and relative deprivation, they are not
subgroup decomposable in the sense of Foster and Shorrocks (1991), since
they cannot be expressed as a sum of poverty indices deﬁned separably over




￿ can be expressed as an in-
tegral of weighted incomes, we will see, however, that it is straightforward
to decompose overall poverty as a sum of subgroup contributions, with the
9contributions involving individual weights that depend on the rank of indi-
viduals in the overall distribution of income. It is this dependence on ranks




￿ indices not decomposable in
the sense indicated above.
Thepropertyof separabilityisnot, however, as desirableasis sometimes
suggestedin theliterature. It isunlikely for instancethat incomparingthem-
selves with others, individuals conﬁne themselves to tight socio-economic
groups. Instead, if concernsof relativity ought to scan the whole distribution
of income to be relevant for the measurement of poverty, then separability
is clearly not a desirable property for a poverty index. Hence, we would not
wish a change in the distribution of incomes in a group to leave poverty un-
altered in another group if assessments of relative deprivation must be made
taking into account the whole population, and not a single subgroup. Or,
to paraphase Sen (1973, p.41), ”if one feels that the social valuation of the
welfare of individuals should depend crucially on the levels of welfare (or
incomes) of others, this property of the independence of each person’s wel-
fare component from the position of others [in other subgroups] has to be
sacriﬁced.”




￿ into subgroup components,denote by
¶







￿ the density of being a member
of group










































































is the proportion of group







￿ thus cumulates the poverty gaps of members of group
„
up to population rank
￿
























































































104 An illustration using LIS data
Toillustratesomeoftheabove relations,weusedatadrawnfromtheLuxem-
bourg Income Study (LIS)10 data sets of Belgium and Denmark (1992 data)
and of Italy and the USA (1991 data). These two pairs of countries were
partly selected because of the interesting features they exhibit in poverty
comparisons, as will become clearer later. The raw data were treated in the
same manner as in Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997), and yielded household
disposable income (i.e., post-tax-and-transfer income) expressed in 1991
adult-equivalent $ US 11. The reference poverty line was set at $7000 in
1991 adult-equivalent US dollars, which appeared to be a reasonable base-
line for poverty comparisons across industrialised countries, and which is
alsoapproximatelythe 1991 Americanpoverty line for singleindividuals. 12
Finally, for the purposes of our illustrations, we do not present here standard
errors for our various estimates, although it is clear that some of the cross-
country comparisons discussed below are not statistically signiﬁcant13.
Table 1 shows the headcounts for the 4 countries mentioned above at
poverty lines of US$7000 and slightly above. Italy has by far the most
poverty by this standard, followed by the United States, Belgium and Den-























the poverty headcounts, the average poverty gaps (and thus absolute depri-
vation)are very similar poverty in Belgiumand in Denmark,and in Italyand
in the USA respectively. It will thus be interesting to check if relative depri-
vation is sufﬁciently different across these countries to affect cross-country








for each of the four countries. The United States
show more relative deprivation than Belgium and Denmark whatever the
10See http://lissy.ceps.lu for detailed information on the structure of these data.
11We apply purchasing power parities drawn from the Penn World Tables (see Summers
and Heston (1991) for the methodology underlying the computation of these parities, and
http://www.nber.org/pwt56.htmlfor access to the 1991 ﬁgures) to convert national currencies into
1991USdollars. As in Gottschalkand Smeeding(1997), we dividehouseholdincomeby an adult-







￿ is household size, so as to allow comparisons of the
welfare of individuals living in households of different sizes. Hence, all incomes are transformed
into 1991 adult-equivalent $US. All household observations are also weighted by the LIS sample
weights “hweight” times the number of persons in the household. Finally, negative incomes are
set to 0.
12ThispovertylineispreciselyequaltoUS$7086. We thankBuhongZhengforthisinformation.
13The standard errors can be computed from the results of Theorem 4 in Davidson and Duclos
(1998), which shows the asymptotic sampling distribution of CPG curves.
11quantiles considered. The Italian relative deprivation proﬁle crosses that of
the four other countries. This also says that although mean absolute depriva-
tion is substantially greater in Italy than in Denmark or in Belgium, for indi-
viduals towards the bottom of the income distributions, relative deprivation























￿ , comparisons of the inequality in poverty gaps across Italy
and the United States can thus be expected to be ambiguous and to depend
on the ethical parameter
￿ .
Before aggregating absolute and relative deprivation, it is useful to con-
sider the CPG curves for the four countries. Figure 4 does this. Multiple
crossings of the CPG curves occur, and only one unambiguous sample or-
dering can be made in the 6 possible comparisonsof countries (for inference
of population orderings, we would need to take into account sampling vari-
ability). Since the sample CPG curve for Denmark is everywhere below that
for the US, it is possible to say that poverty is unambiguously greater for








￿ . The CPG curve for Belgium crosses twice the CPG curve of
Denmark, and the Italian CPG curve crosses the US curve from below at the
very end.





￿ indices for various values of the ethical parameter
￿ .
This is shown in Table 2, with aggregate relative deprivation indicated in
parentheses. For
￿ equal to 2,3 and 4, poverty is lower in Belgium than in
Denmark, Italy or the United States, and Danish poverty is lower than in
Italy and the United States (as was expected from the ranking of the CPG
curves). The comparisons of Italian and American poverty depend on
￿ and
thus on the importance given to relative deprivation in measuring poverty.
For the headcount and for absolute deprivation, Italy has more poverty than





for instance), poverty in the US becomes signiﬁcantly greater.
Figures 5 and 6 show graphically how the indices change with variations
in
￿ and marginal changes in
￿ . Figure 5 conﬁrms that at a poverty line of
$7000, Denmark always has more poverty than Belgium, whatever the value
of
￿ , since it has both more absolute deprivation and generally more indi-
vidual relative deprivation whatever the percentile considered (recall Figure
3). When the poverty line increases up to $7500, however, Belgium starts
to have higher absolute deprivation, and it is then only with suitably high
weights on the relative deprivation of the poor that Belgian poverty can still
be considered lower than the Danish one. Similar remarks apply to the com-














Italian poverty can be considered greater than American poverty only when
sufﬁciently low weight is given to the importance of relative deprivation in
measuring poverty. Otherwise, Italy has less poverty than the US.
Finally, Table 3 shows how poverty in the four countries responds either













































￿ show, these responses depend
on the importance
￿ given to concerns of relative deprivation, on the popula-
tion proportion of the poor and on whetherthe poor are in deep or in shallow





￿ indices are to equal absolute changes in incomes; the more numer-




￿ indices to equal absolute
changes in incomes; and the deeper the absolute and relative deprivation of




￿ indices to equal equiproportionate
changes in everyone’s incomes.
As expected, we ﬁnd in Table 3 that increases in
￿ and in the focus
granted to relative deprivation increase the reaction of poverty to absolute
and equiproportional growth in incomes. For instance, a $1 increase in ev-
















￿ indices for Belgium and Denmark and for Italy and the United
States, the reaction of these indices to changes in incomes are very different.
Since Belgium has more poor than Denmark, its poverty indices react much
more strongly to equal increases of $1, and so does Italy when compared to
the United States. As for a 1% growth in everyone’s income, it is estimated
to bring poverty down much faster in Belgium than in Denmark, and almost










￿ , the average poverty gap) are close within these two pairs
of countries, these important differences are explained by the depth and the
concentration of the relative deprivation experienced by the poor. Depriva-
tion in the US is concentrated on a smaller proportion of the population than
in Italy (see Figure 3); it is thus also more deeply and more relatively felt by
the poorest. This makes inter alia inequality-neutraleconomic growth much
less effective in the United States than in Italy as an instrument of poverty
reduction.
135 Conclusion
Our paper develops the link between poverty and inequality by focussing on
a class of poverty indices which aggregate concerns of absolute deprivation
and relative deprivation. The indices depend upon an ethical parameter
￿
whichcapturestheethicalsensitivity ofpoverty measurementto“exclusion”
or“relative-deprivation” aversion. We showthattheindicesequalthesumof
mean absolute deprivation and of an ethically weighted mean of the individ-
ualrelative deprivation foundamongthe poor. Thegreaterthe valueof
￿ , the
greater the weight assigned to relative deprivation as against absolute depri-
vation in measuring and comparing poverty. We also show how the indices
can be easily used to assess the impact of growth on poverty. Our illustra-
tive section reports that, for a reasonable common poverty line, the United
States have more relative deprivation than Denmark and Belgium whatever
the percentiles considered. For comparisons of total deprivation, however, it
is not possible to order these countries robustly. Since absolute deprivation
is very similar in the four countries considered, poverty comparisons across
them will inevitably depend on the importance granted to concerns over rel-
ative deprivation. The impact of growth on poverty is also seen to depend
on the presence of and on concerns over relative deprivation: in pairwise
comparisons of Italy and the US and of Belgium and Denmark, poverty is
much less responsive to growth in the USA and in Denmark, which is also
where relative deprivation is generally found to be the greatest.
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7000 0.09186 0.06965 0.20478 0.13738
7100 0.09601 0.074192 0.21038 0.14174
7200 0.09886 0.077878 0.21678 0.14565
7300 0.10702 0.081991 0.22384 0.14881
7400 0.10891 0.086221 0.23113 0.15187
























































Belgium(92) 176.20 344.71 506.02 660.55
(0) (168.51) (329.82) (484.35)
Denmark(92) 181.12 355.80 524.32 686.94
(0) (174.68) (343.20) (505.82)
Italy(91) 350.35 661.79 939.85 1189.16
(0) (311.44) (589.50 (838.81)
Usa(91) 348.97 669.75 965.13 1237.60

























































Belgium(92) -0.092 -0.175 -0.251 -0.320
-466.79 -882.26 -1251.36 -1578.58
Denmark(92) -0.070 -0.134 -0.195 -0.251
-306.44 -585.39 -838.91 -1068.95
Italy(91) -0.205 -0.368 -0.497 -0.600
-1083.11 -1911.64 -2540.17 -3011.84
Usa(91) -0.137 -0.256 -0.358 -0.446
-612.68 -1121.44 -1541.64 -1886.45
18Figure 1: Cumulative Poverty Gap Curves
19Figure 2: Absolute deprivation and inequality of poverty
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